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LARGUMENT 
A. The District Court's Ruling that Marquardt Owed No Duty to Robinson was Clearlv 
Erroneous. 
1. Defendant Misinterprets Harrison v. Taylor. 
The lynch pin of Defendant's argument is the notion that a "tenant steps into the shoes of 
the landlord" for the purposes of liability to a third party who comes onto the property, citing to 
the following language from Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989): 
Similarly, a tenant or lessee, having control of the premises is deemed, so far as 
third parties are concerned, to be the owner, and in case of injury to third parties 
occasioned by the condition or use of the premises, the general rule is that the 
tenant or lessee may be liable for failure to keep the premises in repair. 
115 Idaho at 596, 768 P.2d at 1329. However, Defendant both misinterprets the language of this 
Court and takes that statement out of context. Defendant would rewrite the foregoing language 
to read: 
Similarly, a tenant or lessee has control of the premises and thus is deemed, so far 
as third parties are concerned, to be the owner, and in case of injury to third 
parties occasioned by the condition or use ofthe premises, the absolute rule is that 
the tenant or lessee is liable for failure to keep the premises in repair. 
Defendant plucks this sentence out of a paragraph which further reveals the fallacy of 
Defendant's position: 
[T]here is an additional basis for reversing the ruling of the trial court 
here. Either a tenant, or a landlord, or both, may be liable to a third party for 
injuries resultingfrom negligent repairs orfailure to repair. Even in the absence 
of a specific lease provision, and with no controlling statute requiring him to 
make repairs, if a landlord voluntarily undertakes repairs he is bound to use 
reasonable and ordinary care or skill in the execution of the work. 49 AmJur.2d 
§ 795, p. 746 (see cases cited therein). Similarly, a tenant or lessee, having control 
of the premises is deemed, so far as third parties are concemed, to be the owner, 
and in case of injury to third parties occasioned by the condition or use of the 
premises, the general rule is that the tenant or lessee may be liable for failure to 
keep the premises in repair. 
ld. at 596, 768 P.2d at 1329 (citations and references to the record omitted) (emphasis added). 
This Court was not fashioning a rule that a "tenant steps into the shoes of the landlord if the 
tenant is the occupier of the premises and is aware of the alleged dangerous condition." Brief of 
Respondent, p. 8. Rather, this Court stated (l) that either the tenant or the landlord or both may 
have liability to third persons depending on who had the responsibility to repair or maintain the 
premises, and (2) that if a tenant has control of the premises, a tenant may be liable for failure to 
keep the premises in repair. The matters that remained issues of fact for trial, according to this 
Court, were whether the landlord or the tenant had responsibility for maintenance of the sidewalk 
and who had contJOI ufthe premises. ] 15 Idaho at 597, 768 P.2d at 1330. 
The district court in this case erred in determining as a matter of law that Marquardt had 
no duty to Robinson in light of Harrison v. Taylor and in light of the evidence before the Court. 
The uncontroverted evidence regarding maintenance and repair of the premises was that in 2008, 
Marquardt replaced an old, drafty door leading to the second-story deck which had no safety 
railing. R. p. 70. In addition, the lease between Marquardt and \\'inkelman, the tenant said 
nothing about maintenance of the premises and certainly did not require Winkelman to do any 
repair or maintenance. R. p. 78. Finally, the record lacks any evidence that Winkelman did any 
repair or maintenance on the upstairs apmiment he rented from Mrs. Marquardt, who lived 
downstairs. R. p. 35. The inference from this evidence IS that Winkelman did not have 
:2 
responsibility for repair or maintenance of the premises and that the duty to repair and maintain 
the premises was reserved by Marquardt. Thus, there were issues of fact concerning who had a 
duty to Robinson that precluded the district cOUli's granting summary judgment. 
The district court ened in leap-frogging over genuine issues of material fact that should 
have been reserved for trial and in adopting wholesale Defendant's argument that only the tenant 
owes a duty to a third person on the rented premises. A tenant who has control of the premises 
and who is responsible for maintenance and repair may owe a duty of care to a third party; 
however, where there are issues of fact with respect to control and responsibility for maintenance 
and repair of the premises, summary judgment should be denied. "As this Court stated in 
Harrison, '[ d]isputes in this area will normally present a jury question under particular facts, 
unless reasonable minds could not differ. '" Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 676, 273 
P.3d 1266, 1269 (2012) (quoting Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho at 596, 768 P.2d at 1329)). 
B. The District Court Erred in Failing to Consider the General Dutv to Exercise Ordinarv 
Care. 
The district court failed to address the Plaintiff s argument that every person has a 
general duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid subjecting others to foreseeable, unreasonable 
harm. R. pp. 95-102. This was clear error. This Court's decisions have made it clear that 
premises liability is not the only basis of liability of a property owner to another person. In 
Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 179 P.3d 352 (Ct. App. 2008), the Court of Appeals pointed 
this out: 
Our Supreme Court has suggested that premises liability is not the 
exclusive source of duties where a landowner is involved. Instead, circumstances 
may give rise to a general duty of care owed to third parties. See Turpen [v. 
Granieri}, 133 Idaho [244,247-48],985 P.2d [669, 672~73 (1999)]. As a general 
principle, every person, in the conduct of his or her business, has a duty to 
exercise ordinary care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to 
others. Id. at 247, 985 P.2d at 672; Sharp v. W.H Moore Inc, 118 Idaho 297, 300, 
796, P.2d 506, 509 (1990). However, our Supreme Court has also made clear that 
not every person or entity owes a tort duty to everyone else in all circumstances. 
Turpen, 133 Idaho at 247-48,985 P.2d at 672-73. J 
Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 393-94, 179 P.3d 352, 356-57 (Ct. App. 2008). 
Boots v. Winters, like Turpen v. Granieri, involved not a condition on the land, but 
activities on the land. However, Sharp v. WH Moore Inc. involved an unsafe condition: the 
third floor fire escape door with an allegedly faulty lock that could be left unlocked. Sharp, 118 
Idaho 297, 299, 796 P.2d 506, 508 (1990). 
In Sharp, invol ving the rape of a tenalli' ~ employee at work, the Court posited the general 
dutY" to exercise ordinary care as "another reason" for finding, a dutv of care to exist in that case: 
.:... '-' .: 
Another reason for finding a duty of care to exist in this case is the general 
rule that each person has a duty of care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks 
of harm to others. Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980); 
Harper v. Hoffinan, 95 Idaho 933, 523 P.2d 536 (1974). 
Every person has a general duty to use due or ordinary care not to 
injure others, to avoid injury to others by any agency set in 
operation by him, and to do his work, render services or use his 
property as to avoid such injury. [Citations omitted.] The degree 
of care to be exercised must be commensurate with the danger or 
hazard connected with the activity. [Citations omitted.] 
I The Supreme Court in Twpen noted that the landlord's "only ability to prevent the harm"-the death of 
a college student from alcohol poisoning while attending a party at the rented premises-"would be by 
refusing to rent the premises at all. The COUli thus held that the landlord had "no duty under the very 
limited facts presented here." Turpen, 133 Idaho at 248, 985 P.2d at 673. 
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Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181, 188,418 P.2d 278, 285 (1966). Whether the 
duty attaches is largely a question for the trier of fact as to the foreseeability of the 
risk. 
Sharp v. W.H Moore, 118 Idaho at 300,796 P.2d at 509 (emphasis added). 
The Court stated that foreseeability is a flexible concept that vanes with the 
circumstances of each case. "Where the degree of result or harm is great, but preventing it is not 
difficult, a relatively low degree of foreseeability is required. Conversely, where the threatened 
injury is minor, but the burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher degree of foreseeability 
may be required," ld. (citing u.s. 1'. Carrol! Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) 
(Judge Learned Hand); Isaacs r. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Ca1.3d 112,211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 
695 P.2d 653, 658 (1985)). 
Defendant contends that Robinson's position would render premIses liability law 
meaningless. Defendant argues that this Court's discussion of the balancing of the harm 
approach in Sharp was simply an "analogy to establish why a landlord owes an invitee a duty of 
reasonable care." Brief of Respondent at 16. The fallacy of Defendant's arguments concerning 
Sharp is readily apparent in the language employed in Sharp. First, in Sharp this C0U11 did not 
base liability on premises liability and the status of the Plaintiff as an invitee. In fact, this Court 
stated: "The question of whether a landlord owes a duty of reasonable care to the tenants of the 
property was settled by our recent decision in Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 
(1984)." Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300,796 P.2d at 509. Second, this Court in Sharp stated that "in 
addition to the clear rule of Stephens," the general rule of liability was "another reason for 
finding a duty of care." Id. 
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Defendant also maintains that the general rule of liability is not applicable because the 
duties owed to invitees, licensees and trespassers have been defined. This argument is not 
supported by Sharp, in which this Court offered the general duty of care as an additional basis 
for liability. It is not supported by the language of any of the cases discussing the general duty of 
care. This duty is described by the Courts as owed by all persons. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 
Idaho, 244, 248, 985 P.2d 669, 673 (1999); Sharp v. W.H Moore, 118 Idaho 297, 300, 796 P.2d 
506,509 (1990); Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135. 137 (1980); Harper v. 
Hoffman. 95 Idaho 933, 935. 523 P.2d 536, 538 (1974): Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181, 188, 
418 P.2d 278, 285 (1966); Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 393-94, 179 P.3d 352,356-57 (CL 
App.2008). 
The duty is based on foreseeability and a balancing of the harm. As stated in Robinson's 
main brief, when a second-story deck (or recessed dormer or patio) is accessed by a door in the 
apartment and the deck does not have a protective railing surrounding it: it is foreseeable that 
harm may result from the lack of a railing. Moreover, unlike the defendant in Turpen, Marquardt 
had the ability to take reasonable steps to prevent the foreseeable risk of harm inexpensively. 
She only had to install a protective railing around the deck. 
The Court of Appeals in Boots v. Winters pointed out that balancing of the harm is 
emrarzed in onlv in the rare circumstances when a court is called on to extend a dutv beyond its 
>..,; '--' .; .. ..' 
previously recognized scope or when a duty has not previously been recognized. Robinson 
seeks recognition that the landlord's duty of reasonable care under the circumstances to tenants 
extends to the tenant's guests either directly through Stephens or through an extension of the 
6 
Stephens rule; thus, it is appropriate to consider the general duty to exercise reasonable care as an 
additional basis for liability. 
C. The Defendant Misinterprets Stephens v. Stearns. 
Ignoring the agrarian-based feudal genesis of landlord immunity for dangerous conditions 
on the land, Defendant argues that the Court in Stephens and in Sharp "simply expanded the 
definition of an invitee to include the tenant of a landlord, but did not include guests of tenants." 
Brief of Respondent at 11. For several reasons, Defendant is incorrect. First, the Court did not 
use a premises liability/invitee analysis in either case. As set forth above, this Court in ShaTp 
stated that "[t]he question of whether a landlord owes a duty of reasonable care to the tenants of 
the property was settled by our recent decision in Stephens v. Srearns." Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300, 
796 P .2d at 509. 
The concurring opinion in Marcher 1'. Butler, cited with approval by the majority' in 
Harrison v. Taylor, pointed out that the decision in Stephens did not employ the invitee/licensee! 
trespasser analysis used in premises liability cases: 
In Stephens v. Stearns, supra, we heJd that the measure of a landlord's duty is not 
determined under trespasser-licensee-invitee analysis, but rather, "A landlord 
must act as a reasonable person under all of the circumstances including the 
likelihood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such injuries, and the 
burden of reducing or avoiding the risk." Id., at 258, 678 P.2d at 50, quoting 
Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.S. 388,308 A.2d 528,534 (1973). The landlord's duty to 
exercise reasonable care in light of all the circumstances extends to his or her 
tenant or anyone on the premises with {he tenant's consent. PagelsdOlf v. Safeco 
Ins. Co. of America, 91 Wis.2d 734,284 N.W.2d 55, 61 (1973). 
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Marcher, 113 Idaho at 872, 749 P.2d at 491 (Bistline and Huntley, JJ., concurring) (emphasis 
added). 
Second, the injured parties in Stephens and Sharp were tenants, so liability to tenants' 
guests was not an issue in either case. However, extending a landlord's duty of reasonable care 
to tenant's guests was not excluded by the Court in either case and neither case stated that its 
holding was expressly limited to tenants. 
Third, this Court in Stephens comprehensively eliminated landlord immunity. Quoting 
with approval from Sargent 1'. Ross, it simply held landlords to a standard of reasonable care 
under all (not just the) circumstances: 
"We thus bring up to date the other half of landlord-tenant law. HencefOlih, 
landlords as other persons must exercise reasonable care not to subject others to 
an unreasonable risk of harm .... A landlord must act as a reasonable person 
under all of the CIrcumstances including the likelihood of injury to others, the 
probable seriousness of such injuries, and the burden of reducing or avoiding the 
risk. " 
Stephens, 106 Idaho at 258, 678 P.2d at 50 (quoting Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 
528, 534 (1973)). And the Stephens Court did not simply quote this language from Sargent v. 
Ross. It also held: "[W]e today decide to leave the common-law rule and its exceptions behind, 
and we adopt the rule that a landlord is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in light of all the 
circumstances." Stephens. 106 Idaho at 258, 678 P .2d at 50. Thus, when Defendant points out 
that Robinson reads Stephens to hold landlords to a reasonable care standard under all 
circumstances, Defendant is correct. 
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Defendant also grumbles that Robinson cites to out-of-jurisdiction cases in support of her 
arguments. It is an odd complaim given that most of the out-of-jurisdiction cases Robinson cites 
in her brief are cases this Court relied on in Stephens in eliminating the outdated and unfair 
system oflandlord immunity for dangerous conditions on the rented premises.2 
Robinson cautions the Court against being led astray, as the district court was, by 
Defendant's improper superimposing of premises liability, with its emphasis on the status of 
entrants on the land, on landlord liability. These are different theories of liability and are not to 
be muddled together. Defendant argues, for example, that because Stephens did not concern a 
tenant's guest, tenant's guests, as licensees, are only owed a duty to warn. This is a prime 
example of how Defendant muddles the two theories of liability. As set forth in Robinson's 
main brief, in PagelsdOl/v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 91 Wis. 2d 734,284 N.W. 2d 55 (1979), 
the landlord (Mahnke) and the tenant's guest (Pagelsdorf), agreed that the extent of Mahnke's 
duty to Pagelsdorf turned on whether Pagelsdorf was an invitee or licensee. The Supreme Court 
of Wisconsin disagreed, noting that under the common law, when property was leased, the 
2 With the exception of Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hasp., 38 Ca1.3d 112,21 J CaLRptr. 356, 695 P.2d 
653 (]985), and u.s. v. Carroll Towing Co .. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), discussing balancing of harm, 
the other out of jurisdiction cases were cited in Stephens, or in cases relied on by this Court in Stephens. 
See Stephens, 106 Idaho at 258, 678 P.2d at 50, wherein the Court stated that several states in addition to 
Tennessee and New Hampshire had judicially adopted a reasonableness duty of care for landlords, citing 
to PagelsdOliv. Safeco ins. Co. of America, 91 Wis. 2d 734,284 N.W. 2d 55 (1979), and Young v. 
Garwacki, 380 Mass. 162,402 N.E. 2d 1045 (1980), among many other cases. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 
388,308 A.2d 528 (1973), and Wilcox v. Hines, JOO Tenn. 538,46 S.W. 297 (1898), were disclIssed at 
length and relied on by this Court in Stephens, 106 ldaho at 257-58, 678 P.2d at 49-50. Kline v. Burns, 
J II N.H. 87,276 A.2d 248 (1971), was quoted by Sorgen I v. Ross, 113 N.H. at 399,308 A. 2d at 535. 
Antonieyl'icz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836,236 N.W. 2d I (1975), was discussed by the Wisconsin 
Supreme CouI1 in PagelsdOlf 91 Wis. 2d at 739-41, 284 N.W. 2d at 558-59. 
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landlord was not liable for injuries to his tenants or their guests resulting from defects in the 
premises, unless certain exceptions applied. PagelsdOl~(, 91 Wis. 2d at 739-4L 284 N.W. 2d at 
558-59. In other words, the premises liability distinctions between invitee and licensee were not 
part of the old landlord immunity analysis. The landlord did not have a duty to anyone, absent 
certain exceptions. 
That the two theories should not be confused is further supported by Marcher v. Butler in 
pointing out that in Stephens the measure of a landlord's duty was not determined under 
trespasser-licensee-invitee analysis. Marcher, 113 Idaho at 872, 749 P.2d at 491 (Bistline and 
Huntley, n., concurring). See also Harrison 1'. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 593-94,768 P.2d 1321, 
1326-27 (1989) ("The trial court's reliance upon the traditional law pertaining to invitees was 
misplaced. The test is one of reasonableness under all the circumstances, not one of hidden or 
obvious dangers, or exceptions to the traditional general rule of non-liability for landlords.) 
(quoting Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho at 872, 749 P.2d at 491 (Bistline and Huntley, IT., 
concurring». 
Defendant's analysis demotes Slephens v. Stearns to a mere anomaly. Her analysis 
ignores the language employed and the cases relied on by the Court. If this Court intended 
landlords to have the same duties as owners/occupants under a premises liability theory, it would 
have said so. If this Court intended that the focus of the analysis for landlords is the status of the 
person coming onto the leased premises, surely it would have said so. Instead, the Court adopted 
the rule that a landlord is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in light of all the 
circumstances. Stephens, 106 Idaho at 258, 678 P.2d at 50. Arguably, "all circumstances" 
10 
include injuries suffered by a tenant's guest due to a dangerous condition on the premises. 
Instead, this Court quoted with appro"al the mandate that a landlord must "act as a reasonable 
person under all of the circumstances including the likelihood of injury to others, the probable 
seriousness of such injuries, and the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk." Stephens, 106 
Idaho at 258,678 P.2d at 50 (quoting Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (1973)). 
D. Defendant is Not Entitled to Attornev's Fees. 
The trial court ruled as a matter of law tbat Marquardt owed no duty to Robinson. Even 
if Defendant's analysis and arguments concerning Stephens v. Stearns vis-a-vis tenant's guests is 
correct, and even if her analysis of the general duty to exercise reasonable care is correct, the 
district court nevertheless ignored issues of fact with respect to the duty to maintain and repair 
the premises and thus who had control of the premises, and accordingly a duty to warn Robinson. 
On that basis alone, summary judgment was inappropriate. Moreover, Robinson is not asking 
this Court to second-Q:uess the district cOllli's leQ:aJ rulinQ:s. Rather, Robinson is askinQ. this 
'-' ...... ...... '-' 
COUli to give no deference to the trial court's legal rulings and to establish that Stephens v, 
Srearns indeed applies to a tenant's guests, something the district expressly declined to do. R. p. 
99. Robinson is asking this COUli to hold that an additional reason for reversing is that 
Marquardt also had a general duty to use her property in such as way as to avoid subjecting 
others, including Robinson, to an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm. Robinson is basing her 
arguments for an extension or declaration of the law on this Court's prior decision in Stephens 
which has not been overturned, and on Shmp, which has also not been overturned. Accordingly, 
i1 
this appeal has a strong basis in the law and was not brought frivolously. Defendant's request for 
attorney's fees should be denied. 
n. CONCLUSION 
There is nothing frightening or extraordinary about the landlord duty to exercise 
reasonable care under all of the circumstances. It is the standard of care by which we all order 
our conduct so as to avoid subjecting others to unreasonable risks of foreseeable harm. It does 
not sentence a landlord to strict liability, nor does it require a landlord to take every possible 
precaution. It only requires reasonableness. Recognizing or extending this standard of care of 
landlords to their tenant's guests also serves the public policy of requiring landlords to provide 
reasonably safe premises. It serves the purpose of encouraging reasonable repair and 
maintenance of rental premises. Robinson respectfull.y requests the Court to reverse summary 
judgment ruling that landlords are held to a standard of reasonable care under all the 
circumstances, including toward the guests of a landlord's tenants. 
Respectfully submitted this !]!)ray of October, 2013. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A . 
.T.C. Meyer 
for Plaintiff Tv,,'ylla 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of October, 2013, I caused to be served two 
true and con-ect copies of the foregoing REPL Y BRIEF OF APPELLANT by the method 
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Michael Haman 
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